We checked 37 ways to turn money into money: park it, lend it, buy something that already earns, buy customers, or trade it. 2025–26 base rates, checked against Ukrainian rules.
Money alone earns ~6% a year. $10k a month that way takes ~$2M. With less, use money to buy a small app that already earns and let AI stop it shrinking.
How we got here. Four research agents covered four tracks: buying businesses (Empire Flippers API, 169 listings; Flippa, 256 cards; TrustMRR, 47), buying customers (RevenueCat, PvX cohorts, Better Collective filings), yield, lending and speculation (Ministry of Finance auctions, NBU, US Treasury, DeFiLlama, broker loss disclosures), and buying audiences or flipping (Telegram, newsletters, domains, GPUs, royalties).
The rule we found. The shorter the chain from money to money, the closer the return gets to the market rate, because every other dollar competes there. In October 2026 the market rate for a Ukrainian resident is about 6% a year in dollars (UAH war bonds, tax-free), and money abroad is blocked. Anything above that is paid for with work, size, access or risk.
Why an app. A small subscription app sells for ~2–2.5× yearly profit: a 40%+ cash yield if profit holds. Apple and Google pay a Ukrainian FOP, and the app transfers with its subscribers and reviews. Typical listings shrink ~20% a year because the seller stopped working on them, which is the gap AI agents can close. Realistically that is 17% a year, and ~40% if AI holds profit flat.
If you have under ~$50k, money is not the lever. Park it in war bonds and keep the zero-capital studio plan from the last report as the main income.
Steps between the money going in and the money coming back. Fewer steps = less work, but lower return.
War bonds, deposits, T-bills, stablecoins. Money sits and earns interest.
P2P loans, revenue-based financing, Ukrainian corporate bonds. Someone else uses it and pays interest.
A subscription app, small software, a YouTube channel, a Telegram channel. Cash flow from the first payout.
Pay for ads, sell to the people they bring: your app, an affiliate offer, leads.
Time → product or service → distribution → money. The 9 rounds so far.
Forex, CFDs, crypto, prop firms, prediction markets, betting arbitrage, skins.
Distance counts the steps between your money going in and money coming back out. Distance 0 is pure financial yield. Distance 1 is buying a thing that already earns or lending to someone who does. Distance 2 is buying customers and reselling. Distance 3+ is building something first.
Returns are typical net returns per year on the money, after fees, defaults and expected decline, before your personal tax (war bonds are tax-free; deposits, bonds and trading gains are taxed 23%; business income through the FOP pays 6% of revenue). Capital for $10k a month = $120,000 ÷ typical return.
"~98% of startups never reach $10k a month": about 2% of payment-verified startups on TrustMRR make $10k+ a month (from our previous round, research_notes/Money path/m1).
Money needed to net ~$10k a month at the typical return. Dashed lines = $50k, $250k and $1M of capital. Ads and trading lose money at the typical outcome, so they are not on this chart.
Capital = $120,000 a year ÷ typical net return. For bought businesses the low end of each bar is the price of $10k a month of *today’s* profit (at the paid multiple, profit held flat). The dot is the typical case after the profit decline seen in live listings (41% of Empire Flippers’ digital listings show falling profit; content sites 58%).
Sources: track A (multiples from Acquire.com, Flippa H1 2026, Empire Flippers 2025), track C (Ministry of Finance auction of 20 Oct 2026, NBU rates, US Treasury curve, DeFiLlama), track D (Telegram, agencies, GPUs, royalties, domains). Arithmetic is in each research note.
Right = more return. Down = more likely you end with less than you started. Green box = what you want. Red band = loses money on average.
Return is the typical net return per year from the research (after fees, defaults and expected decline). Chance of losing is measured where a base rate exists: CFD accounts 71% (median of 14 UK broker disclosures), Polymarket wallets 84%, prop-firm buyers ~93% never paid. Elsewhere it is our estimate from the evidence in each research note, e.g. "~1 in 4 app purchases lose money" or "70–90% of solo newcomers lose their ad test budget". No audited loss rate exists for small website and app purchases.
Net per month from each route at four amounts of capital. Full bar = $10k.
A test budget, not capital. Park it in war bonds and keep the studio plan as your main income.
Buys one small app: ~$2k a month on day one. A start, not $10k.
Sweet spot: ~$9k a month of profit on day one. It stays near $10k only if AI stops the decline.
Clears $10k with a mix: war bonds as the floor plus 2–3 earning assets. Money alone still only makes ~$5k.
Day one = yearly profit ÷ 2.4 (the typical paid multiple for apps, content and newsletters). "If it shrinks" = 17% a year, the realistic net return after the typical ~20% yearly profit decline and deal costs (track A). War bonds = 6.1% in dollars (UAH 15.09% coupon, tax-free, minus the hryvnia’s 8.4% fall over the last 12 months). Telegram channels = 40% a year typical (track D), but good channels for sale are scarce, so the ceiling is ~$1.5–5k a month.
Why pure money → money pays so little, and what you can add
Money competes with all other money. Alone, it earns the market rate. Anything above ~6% a year is paid for with one of four things:
Hold profit flat and 17% becomes ~40%
A small app bought at 2.4× pays 42% a year if its profit holds. Typical listings shrink ~20% a year because the seller stopped working on them. AI agents doing store optimisation, paywall tests, updates and translations are the edge.
your edge2–3× profit, not 10–20×
Funds can’t bother with a $100k app, so sellers accept 2–3× yearly profit. You are paid for buying what big money ignores, and you carry the risk alone.
real, with riskDeals few can reach
Ukrainian Telegram channels paid in UAH, your iGaming and Bali/Phuket networks. Small markets, but nobody abroad competes for them.
small71–97% think they have it
Trading, betting and prediction markets sell the feeling of an edge. Measured: 71% of CFD accounts, 84% of Polymarket wallets, 97% of persistent day traders lose.
trapThis is why the money → money list splits so cleanly. Bonds and T-bills are pure money and pay the market rate. Lending adds credit risk for a few points more. Buying a small business adds size and work. Ads add skill. Trading adds nothing measurable, and the measured outcome is negative.
For you, the one edge that is cheap and real is work done by AI. The goal is not to find a magic money machine. It is to buy cash flow at 2–3× profit and use AI to keep it from shrinking.
37 routes. Distance: 0 = pure yield, 1 = buy or lend, 2 = buy customers. "Lose money" = chance a serious attempt ends below its starting capital (measured where a base rate exists, else our estimate).
| Model | Distance | Net / yr | Capital for $10k/mo | First $ | Lose money | Fast | Digital | Monthly | Owned | Ukraine | AI edge | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ◎ Subscription app (App Store / Play)Best fit with Paddle SaaS: the money already flows to Ukraine and the transfer is clean, but $10k/month costs about… | 1 | 17% | $706k | 2 mo | ~25% | so-so | yes | yes | so-so | yes | high | do |
| Small software on PaddleThe cleanest owned, recurring asset for this owner if billing is on Paddle or can move there; about 17%/yr typical… | 1 | 17% | $706k | 3 mo | ~25% | so-so | yes | yes | yes | so-so | high | do |
| UAH war bonds (OVDP)Best place to park cash: tax-free, legal, liquid. Not an income below ~$2M. | 0 | 6% | $2M | 3 mo | ~20% | yes | yes | so-so | yes | yes | none | maybe |
| USD war bondsSafe dollar parking at ~3.8%; $3.2M for $10k a month. | 0 | 3.8% | $3.2M | 3 mo | ~3% | yes | yes | so-so | yes | yes | none | maybe |
| US T-bills / money fundsThe cleanest dollar yield in the world, but out of reach for a Ukrainian resident under martial law, and it needs… | 0 | 4.2% | $2.8M | 4 wks | ~1% | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | none | skip |
| Ukrainian bank depositsStrictly worse than OVDP (taxed 23%, similar rate); use only for cash you need to reach quickly. | 0 | 5.1% | $2.3M | 4 wks | ~20% | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | none | skip |
| Stablecoin yieldThe only ~4% dollar yield reachable without a bank wire abroad, but legally grey, taxed 23% and with depeg/hack tail… | 0 | 4% | $3M | ≤1 wk | ~8% | yes | yes | yes | yes | so-so | none | skip |
| Crypto basis-trade botPaid less than T-bills over the last 12 months (BTC 3.4%, SOL negative) while carrying exchange-failure risk; not… | 0 | 3% | $4M | ≤1 wk | ~15% | yes | yes | so-so | yes | no | some | skip |
| Ukrainian corporate bondsMicro-lender credit at 22–24% in UAH, taxed 23%: a small slice at most. | 0 | 10.7% | $1.1M | 3 mo | ~25% | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | none | skip |
| European P2P lendingA headline 10% that hides large recovery books, and no legal way to fund it from Ukraine. | 1 | 10% | $1.2M | 4 wks | ~30% | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | none | skip |
| Revenue-based / merchant financingHigh gross yields eaten by 10-25% defaults, and closed to a Ukrainian individual. | 1 | 8% | $1.5M | 4 wks | ~20% | so-so | yes | yes | so-so | no | none | skip |
| Fund other studios’ ads for a revenue shareReal asset class for $1M+ funds, but a solo micro version gets adversely selected studios and is blocked by… | 1 | 8% | $1.5M | 2 mo | ~40% | so-so | yes | yes | so-so | no | some | skip |
| Buy a YouTube channelHighest cash yield (about 55%) and the best match for the owner's AI video skill, but the platform risk is… | 1 | 21% | $571k | 6 wks | ~35% | so-so | yes | yes | so-so | yes | high | maybe |
| Buy, improve, resell an appPlays straight to the owner's AI build skills and app-store payouts work in Ukraine, but the payoff is a lumpy exit… | 1 | 30% | $400k | 2 mo | ~25% | so-so | yes | so-so | yes | so-so | high | maybe |
| Buy a small agency + automate itBest path to scale and the best match for the owner's AI edge, but it takes 2-4 months to close and is hands-on, not… | 1 | 25% | $480k | 3 mo | ~35% | so-so | yes | yes | yes | so-so | high | maybe |
| Ukrainian Telegram channelsBest first move in this track: cheap, fast and paid in UAH inside Ukraine, but bot fraud, no legal title and a thin… | 1 | 40% | $300k | 3 wks | ~30% | yes | yes | yes | so-so | so-so | some | maybe |
| Buy a newsletterThe email list is truly owned, but only sponsor/ad-funded newsletters fit Ukrainian rails and there are few deals. | 1 | 17% | $706k | 2 mo | ~30% | so-so | yes | yes | yes | so-so | some | maybe |
| WordPress plugin / Chrome extensionGood AI-maintenance fit and Freemius pays Ukraine, but almost no transaction data and few listings of useful size. | 1 | 16% | $750k | 2 mo | ~30% | so-so | yes | yes | so-so | so-so | high | maybe |
| Amazon KDP book catalogueNumbers look good (about 22%/yr typical) and payouts reach Ukraine, but it is a single-platform asset outside the… | 1 | 22% | $545k | 2 mo | ~30% | so-so | so-so | yes | so-so | so-so | some | maybe |
| Content / affiliate siteCheapest yield on paper (about 42%) but Google and AI answers are draining traffic; after decline about 12%/yr with… | 1 | 12% | $1M | 2 mo | ~50% | so-so | yes | yes | no | so-so | some | skip |
| Music royaltiesThe most passive model here, but a ~7% real yield means ~$1.7M for $10k/month, and the wire out of Ukraine is… | 1 | 7% | $1.7M | 4 mo | ~30% | no | yes | yes | yes | no | none | skip |
| GPU rental (hardware)Hardware bought at inflated 2026 prices, volatile rental rates and Ukrainian rails make this a poor fit. | 1 | 10% | $1.2M | 2 mo | ~40% | so-so | no | yes | yes | no | none | skip |
| Domain flippingLumpy, slow and near-zero typical return; expired-domain SEO is explicitly named in Google's spam policies. | 1 | 3% | $4M | 6 mo | ~60% | no | yes | no | yes | no | none | skip |
| Buy Instagram / TikTok accountsInstagram's terms ban buying accounts outright; you can never own what you paid for. | 1 | 0% | never | 2 wks | ~60% | yes | yes | so-so | no | no | none | skip |
| Shopify / Amazon FBA brandFails the digital gate; shown only as the market's comparison point. | 1 | 22% | $545k | 3 mo | ~40% | so-so | no | so-so | so-so | no | some | skip |
| Ads into your own appOnly after you own an app whose buyers pay back the ads. Then it is the purest money → money loop. | 3 | -50% | never | 2 mo | ~80% | so-so | yes | yes | yes | so-so | high | maybe |
| Licensed iGaming ads (affiliate)The only paid-traffic model where the owner has a real edge (operator relationships), but platform restrictions are… | 2 | -20% | never | 2 mo | ~70% | so-so | yes | yes | so-so | so-so | some | skip |
| White-hat CPA traffic arbitrageFast feedback but thin margins that Ukrainian VAT plus gross-turnover tax wipe out, nothing owned, and most… | 2 | -30% | never | 3 wks | ~80% | yes | yes | so-so | no | so-so | some | skip |
| Resell Telegram ad slotsNeeds little capital because it is really an ad agency: the limit is selling to advertisers, not money. | 2 | 0% | never | 3 wks | ~50% | yes | yes | so-so | no | so-so | none | skip |
| Paid leads for Bali/Phuket developersA real relationship edge in buying-and-reselling customers, but lumpy, slow and not truly recurring. | 2 | 20% | $50k | 3 mo | ~60% | no | so-so | so-so | so-so | so-so | some | skip |
| Grey traffic arbitrage (excluded)Excluded: the famous arbitrage ROIs live here, and the owner will not do grey or illegal work. | 2 | -40% | never | 2 wks | ~70% | yes | yes | so-so | no | no | some | skip |
| Retail trading (CFD, forex, day trading)A losing game for 70-97% of players; not a business. | 0 | -20% | never | ≤1 wk | ~75% | yes | yes | no | yes | no | some | skip |
| Prop-firm challengesThe firm's business model is your failed challenge fees; 7% ever get paid. | 0 | -60% | never | 4 wks | ~93% | yes | yes | no | no | so-so | some | skip |
| Prediction markets84% lose; the winners are a few dozen professional bots and insiders. | 0 | -10% | never | ≤1 wk | ~84% | yes | yes | no | yes | so-so | some | skip |
| Sports-betting arbitrageSmall real edge that bookmakers shut down within months; a job, not a money machine. | 0 | 15% | never | ≤1 wk | ~50% | yes | yes | no | no | no | some | skip |
| CS2 skin flippingA market one company can reprice overnight, as it did on 23 Oct 2025. | 1 | -10% | never | ≤1 wk | ~60% | yes | yes | no | no | so-so | none | skip |
| Crypto tradingA price bet, not income; most retail buyers historically lost. | 0 | -10% | never | ≤1 wk | ~60% | yes | yes | no | yes | so-so | some | skip |
Gates are yours: fast (money in weeks), digital, monthly money, owned end to end. Ukraine = can a Ukrainian resident do it legally with working payment rails. AI edge = how much AI agents can improve the result. Capital "—" = loses money at the typical outcome.
Subscription app (App Store / Play) (distance 1): Best fit with Paddle SaaS: the money already flows to Ukraine and the transfer is clean, but $10k/month costs about $290k in purchases today and about $700k once decline is priced in. Return basis: Typical: paid multiple 2.4x annual profit -> 42% cash yield (Flippa H1 2026 app average sold 2.62x; live Flippa iOS asking median 2.2x, Android 2.7x) minus ~20%/yr expected profit decline (Flippa app deal value -15% half-on-half; most listed apps ~1 year old; RevenueCat: only 4.6% of new apps reach $10k/month within 2 years) minus ~5%/yr frictions (deal costs + API/creative refresh) = 17%. High: bought at 2x and grown 10%/yr. Low: young trend app halves and resells at ~1x. Sources: fl_h1, fl_live, rc, ef_api, est. Losing: No measured buyer-outcome rate exists. Proxies: RevenueCat 2026 says 17.3% of new apps reach $1k/month and 4.6% reach $10k/month within two years, so lost momentum is hard to rebuild; most apps listed on Flippa today are about 1 year old. Estimate: young (<2 yr) trend/AI apps 40-60% chance of losing over half their revenue within 12 months; 3+ year-old utilities 15-25%. Ukraine: green - Apple and Google Play pay Ukrainian developers in USD to a bank account (Google Play lists Ukraine as a merchant location; Apple works in practice, no official Apple page naming Ukraine found); app transfers keep ratings, reviews and subscriptions. The purchase payment must go through Empire Flippers' own escrow or FlippaPay because Escrow.com refuses Ukrainian bank accounts; the FOP's bank needs a foreign economic contract.
Small software on Paddle (distance 1): The cleanest owned, recurring asset for this owner if billing is on Paddle or can move there; about 17%/yr typical after churn, so $10k/month costs about $380k at purchase and about $700k once decline is priced in. Return basis: Typical: paid multiple 3.2x annual profit -> 31% cash yield (Acquire.com confirmed SaaS sales 3.9x median in 2024 and 2025, 3.7x under $100k revenue; Flippa SaaS sold average 2.47x H1 2026; FE 2.5-4x SDE under $5M; live asking medians Flippa 2.85x, EF 2.85x) minus ~10%/yr profit decline (half of live EF SaaS/subscription listings show falling profit; small-SaaS logo churn 3-7%/month) minus ~4%/yr frictions = 17%. High: bought at 2.5x and grown 10%/yr. Sources: acq_blog, acq_pdf, fl_h1, fe_buy, fl_live, ef_api, churn, est. Losing: No micro-SaaS buyer-outcome survey found. 7 of 14 SaaS/subscription listings on Empire Flippers (Oct 2026) show falling profit; Empire Flippers expects micro-SaaS under $500k to be squeezed by AI 'vibe-coding'. For large-company M&A, 60-70% of deals miss financial expectations (Bain via FE) - not a micro-deal base rate. Ukraine: yellow - Paddle accepts sellers in Ukraine (only occupied regions excluded) and pays by wire/Payoneer, so a Paddle-native SaaS is green. Most small SaaS bill through Stripe, which is closed to Ukraine: subscribers must be moved to Paddle (Paddle cites a 12-day median migration via card-vault transfer, which needs the seller's Stripe cooperation) or some will be lost. Escrow.com is blocked; use Empire Flippers escrow or FlippaPay. Keeping Stripe via a foreign entity plus nominee is risky (KYC, CFC rules).
UAH war bonds (OVDP) (distance 0): Best legal yield a Ukrainian resident has (15% tax-free), but it paid ~6% in dollars last year, so $10k/month real needs ~$2M. Return basis: Nominal: 1y UAH OVDP 15.09%, 2.4y 16.45% at the 2026-10-20 auction (ovdp_112; KrokFin shows 15.01%/16.38%). Tax-exempt for individuals incl. military levy (krokfin_ovdp, smida_ovdp). In USD: UAH fell 8.43% vs USD from 41.9969 to 45.5382 (2025-10-27 -> 2026-10-27, nbu_fx), so 1.1509/1.0843-1 = 6.1% USD-equivalent (typical). High = calendar-2025 case (UAH -0.77%): ~14.6%. Low = a 20%+ devaluation year (estimate). Losing: Nominal default risk on domestic OVDP has not materialised during the war (estimate, not verified here); the real risk is devaluation: in the last 12 months it ate ~55% of the coupon. A loss in USD needs a devaluation above ~15% in a year. Ukraine: green - built for residents: Diia, bank apps, ICU/brokers; income tax-exempt; no currency-control issue.
USD war bonds (distance 0): Tax-free dollar parking at ~3.8%, a little under US T-bills, and actually reachable; $3.2M for $10k/month. Return basis: USD OVDP trading in circulation at 3.13-4.17% (KrokFin, 2026-10-20); no USD/EUR placements at the October 2026 auctions (krokfin_ovdp/112.ua). Tax-exempt. Retail bank quotes are lower than these (markups). Losing: Low in normal times; concentrated Ukrainian sovereign risk (estimate). Ukraine: green - Diia/banks; cash USD can be bought without limit and placed in a Ukrainian bank (nbu_pres).
US T-bills / money funds (distance 0): The cleanest dollar yield in the world, but out of reach for a Ukrainian resident under martial law, and it needs ~$2.8M pre-tax ($3.7M after tax) anyway. Return basis: 3m bill 4.22%, 1y 4.47% on 2026-10-26 (ust). Fed target 3.75-4.00%, EFFR 3.88% after a 25bp hike on 2026-09-17 (effr). MMFs ~3.6-3.9% (Crane 100 was 3.49% on 2026-08-14 before the hike, crane; post-hike level estimated from EFFR). Losing: Near zero credit risk in USD terms. Ukraine: red - e-limit (EUR200k/yr in peacetime) is not granted during martial law, so a resident cannot legally wire capital to a foreign broker (unex, kredo); MCC 6211 (brokers) is excluded from the card limit (nbu_res90). Only route: foreign securities with delivery in the Ukrainian depository, bought within the 200k UAH/month FX limit (~$4,392/month = ~$52.7k/yr, nbu_aug) - at that pace $2.84M takes ~54 years.
Ukrainian bank deposits (distance 0): Strictly worse than OVDP (taxed 23%, similar rate); use only for cash you need to reach quickly. Return basis: UAH: PrivatBank 13-14% for 12m (minfin_privat), small banks up to 17.5% (minfin_dep). USD: PrivatBank 0.01%, best 2.5-3% at small banks (minfin_dep_usd). Typical UAH 14% -> USD-equivalent 1.14/1.0843-1 = 5.1% before tax (nbu_fx). Low = USD deposit at a big bank (~0%). Losing: Fully guaranteed during martial law + 3 months; afterwards only 600,000 UAH (~$13k) per bank (fgv). Devaluation risk on UAH. Ukraine: green - but interest is taxed 18% PIT + 5% military levy at source.
Stablecoin yield (distance 0): The only ~4% dollar yield reachable without a bank wire abroad, but legally grey, taxed 23% and with depeg/hack tail risk; $3-3.9M for $10k/month. Return basis: DeFiLlama 2026-10-27: Aave v3 USDC 3.78% (12m avg 3.45%), Sky sUSDS 3.80%, Maple USDC 5.08% (12m 5.21%), Ondo USDY 3.74%, BUIDL 3.84%, Ethena sUSDe 5.07% (12m avg 4.29%; 6.52% in 2025; 17.47% in 2024) (llama, llama_susde). WhiteBIT flexible USDT ~1.9% (whitebit). BUIDL needs $5M and qualified-purchaser status (buidl); USDY is non-US KYC (usdy). Losing: Rare but large: USDe traded at $0.65 on Binance on 2025-10-10 (oct10); USDe supply fell $8.3B afterwards (usde_out); sUSDe TVL went from $5.86B to $1.26B in a year (llama_susde). Smart-contract hacks and exchange failures (FTX) are the tail. Ukraine: yellow - no cross-border bank transfer is needed once you hold stablecoins, but buying crypto with hryvnia has been banned by the NBU since April 2022 (forinsurer) and P2P card flows trigger bank monitoring (aktualno); crypto income taxed 18%+5% under interim DPS guidance; virtual-assets law not in force.
Crypto basis-trade bot (distance 0): Paid less than T-bills over the last 12 months (BTC 3.4%, SOL negative) while carrying exchange-failure risk; not worth it. Return basis: Own calculation from Binance funding history: BTCUSDT 3.43%, ETHUSDT 2.51%, SOLUSDT -0.43% annualised (2025-10-27 -> 2026-10-26); calendar 2025: BTC 5.13%, ETH 4.93%; BTC funding negative in 22.8% of periods (binance_fr). Minus ~0.2-0.5pp fees/rebalancing. sUSDe (the packaged version of this trade) averaged 4.29% over the same 12 months (llama_susde). Losing: Most months positive, but returns compressed to below T-bill levels in 2026; losses come from tail events (exchange failure, auto-deleveraging, short-leg liquidation). Ukraine: yellow/red - needs exchange accounts with derivatives and crypto bought via P2P (NBU hryvnia ban); grey legal status; 23% tax.
Ukrainian corporate bonds (distance 0): Pays more than OVDP only because it is riskier and taxed; fine as a small slice, not a $10k/month engine. Return basis: Retail issues mid-2026: CreditKasa 22% (yr 1), ShvydkoGroshi 24% UAH, 100M UAH issues each (forbes_corp); ICU fund launched 2026-10-19, yield not disclosed (forbes_icu). Typical 20% UAH gross -> USD-eq 1.20/1.0843-1 = 10.7% before tax; low = issuer default (estimate). Losing: No published default base rate for this retail segment (gap); issuers are consumer micro-lenders, the riskiest credit in the country. Ukraine: green - local brokers/apps; taxed 23%.
European P2P lending (distance 1): A headline 10% that hides large recovery books, and no legal way to fund it from Ukraine. Return basis: Mintos median self-reported investor XIRR 10.5%, middle half 8.7-12.2% (1,079 portfolios, p2pdash) - survivorship-biased; PeerBerry ~10% advertised (p2pempire). But ~29% of Mintos book in recovery (Aug 2026, euromaidan) and ~60.2% of EstateGuru's live book in recovery (estateguru); Bondora recovers 31-54% of defaulted principal (bondora). Low = platform failure/recovery case (estimate). Losing: History is poor: Russian/Ukrainian originators frozen in 2022 (thepaypers), ~EUR130M of 2020-22 Mintos defaults still in recovery (p2pdash), EstateGuru majority in recovery; PeerBerry is the exception (EUR51.4M war loans repaid by Dec 2024). Ukraine: red - platforms want an EU/EEA bank account in your own name (PeerBerry) and, above all, a resident cannot legally wire capital to a foreign account (e-limit suspended). Platform-by-platform acceptance of UA residents not verified (gap).
Revenue-based / merchant financing (distance 1): High gross yields eaten by 10-25% defaults, and closed to a Ukrainian individual. Return basis: Borrower cost 15-30% effective for MCA, 6-12% for well-qualified RBF; MCA defaults typically 10-25% (mca_crest); MCA provider defaults rose 59% to $2.22B in 2024 (mca_barchart); syndication fees 3-5% of remittances. Typical net 8% is an estimate for a passive syndicate participant. Losing: Roughly 1 in 5 MCA deals ends in default (mca_crest); passive participants carry pro-rata losses with limited recourse. Ukraine: red - US/EU syndication needs a local entity and accreditation; capital export blocked; lending to Ukrainian businesses as an individual needs a financial licence.
Fund other studios’ ads for a revenue share (distance 1): Real asset class for $1M+ funds, but a solo micro version gets adversely selected studios and is blocked by Ukrainian capital controls. Return basis: PvX funds up to 80% of CAC, sweeps 80% of net revenue until repaid, then interest; studio cost 9-12% annualized [pvx] = financier's gross yield before losses; ~40% of cohorts below 1.0 net ROAS at 12 months [pvx]. Typical net ~8% after losses and admin for a diversified lender; a solo micro-lender faces adverse selection [est]. Losing: PvX data: ~40% of casual-game cohorts below 1.0 net ROAS at M12 [pvx]; institutional players commit ~$12.5M per company on average ($250M / 20) [pvx_pgb]; Pollen VC has stopped accepting applications [pollen]. No micro-lender base rate. Ukraine: red: lending to or investing in non-residents is a capital operation; a Ukrainian bank says the EUR200k/yr e-limit (covering loans to non-residents and investments abroad) is suspended under martial law (NBU Resolution 18) [kredo]; interest is passive income outside the single tax. Workaround (not legal advice): contract as an advertising-services exporter paid by revenue share, which is model owned-app-paid-ua applied to someone else's app.
Buy a YouTube channel (distance 1): Highest cash yield (about 55%) and the best match for the owner's AI video skill, but the platform risk is all-or-nothing - buy small and spread across channels. Return basis: Typical: paid multiple 1.8x -> 56% cash yield (Flippa YouTube sold average 1.57x H1 2026; EF live YouTube median 1.87x) minus ~25%/yr decline (algorithm and policy risk; 44% of EF YouTube listings show falling profit although the median trend is +10%) minus ~10%/yr production cost to keep uploading = 21%. Sources: fl_h1, ef_api, ef_soi, est. Losing: No buyer-outcome data. 7 of 16 YouTube listings on Empire Flippers show falling profit (Oct 2026). Empire Flippers warns of 'deep platform risk'; channels built on reused or mass-produced AI content risk demonetization (sibling note on AI channels). Ukraine: green - the YouTube Partner Program lists Ukraine and AdSense pays Ukraine by USD wire; US-viewer earnings carry US withholding (10% with a W-8BEN treaty claim, sibling note). The channel moves via Brand Account ownership (mechanics not re-verified here). Escrow.com blocked; use Empire Flippers escrow or FlippaPay.
Buy, improve, resell an app (distance 1): Plays straight to the owner's AI build skills and app-store payouts work in Ukraine, but the payoff is a lumpy exit and the buy side has no escrow. Return basis: Flippa 2025: apps average 2.4x profit (top quartile 5.4x); $10-100k deals average 1.8x, $1M+ deals 2.9x (flippa-2025). Example: $30k profit bought at 2.0x = $60k. Success (+40% profit, resold at 2.4x, 10% fees, plus cash flow) ~ +110%; flat ~ +40%; failure (-30% profit, 1.8x) ~ -2%. Weighted typical ~30%/yr [Estimate]. Improvement evidence is vendor cases only (radaso, revenuecat). Losing: No base rate for flip outcomes; public stories are survivors. Small apps often lose profit to store-policy or ranking changes; assume about 1 in 4 flips loses money [Estimate]. Ukraine: yellow: Google Play wire payouts list Ukraine (USD, $100 minimum); Apple payouts to Ukrainian banks are not verified this round. Avoid Stripe-billed SaaS. Escrow.com will not take a Ukrainian wire, so you need a direct SWIFT contract or seller financing. Resale gains are likely personal income, not FOP income (ask a tax adviser).
Buy a small agency + automate it (distance 1): Best path to scale and the best match for the owner's AI edge, but it takes 2-4 months to close and is hands-on, not passive. Return basis: Multiples: Flippa services average 1.2x profit (flippa-2025); US small businesses average 2.7x SDE (bbs-q2-2026); owner-run agencies 2.5-3.5x SDE (agencies-co). Example: $120k SDE bought at 2x = $240k; replace seller labour with $40k of contractor + AI = $80k; 20% first-year client churn = ~$64k, about 27%, rounded to 25% typical [Estimate]. Big rollups claim margins rising from 5-15% to 35%+ (gc-rollup, unaudited). Losing: No small-deal base rate. Main failure is key clients leaving with the seller; holdbacks and earnouts tied to renewals are standard because this happens often (acquire-agency). Ukraine: yellow: an asset deal (client contracts) can be novated to the FOP, with B2B clients paying by SWIFT or Payoneer. The seller's Stripe billing cannot be transferred. Escrow.com refuses Ukrainian banks, but seller financing or an earnout avoids escrow. Avoid bookkeeping, whose clients fear handing over data.
Ukrainian Telegram channels (distance 1): Best first move in this track: cheap, fast and paid in UAH inside Ukraine, but bot fraud, no legal title and a thin market cap it at roughly $1.5-5k/month. Return basis: Channels change hands at ~14-22 months of revenue in Ukraine (tg-bizasset 20-22 mo; RU market 5-8 mo per tg-vcru). Example: 15k subs, 3k views/post, 12 posts/mo x ~2,500 UAH (tg-telegator price bands) = ~$720/mo, bought for ~$10k (top of the 'commercial niche 5-20k' band, tg-uasmm-price) = 86% gross. Less 10-15% content/admin = ~75%; less ~20%/yr audience and ad-demand decay after transfer = ~56-60%; less a fraud provision (1 in 4 buys loses half) = ~40% typical [Estimate]. Revenue share adds only $0.5-4/mo per 1k subs (tg-revshare-blogs). Losing: No published base rate. Bot subscribers cost 21-63 UAH per 1,000, so inflated channels are common; working assumption: 1 in 3-4 listed channels is materially inflated [Estimate]. With proper view and ERR checks, maybe 1 in 4-5 buys loses money. Ukraine: yellow: ad posts sold to Ukrainian advertisers are paid in UAH into the FOP (group 3, 5%+1% of gross). TON revenue share is crypto and falls outside the FOP: 18% PIT + 5% military levy, plus Fragment KYC. No legal title. Draft platform law (April 2026) and proposals to ban anonymous channels add regulatory risk.
Buy a newsletter (distance 1): The email list is truly owned, but only sponsor/ad-funded newsletters fit Ukrainian rails and there are few deals. Return basis: Typical: paid multiple 2.5x -> 40% cash yield (broker guide 2.5-3.75x annual profit, lists under 15k subscribers 1.2-1.8x; EF live newsletter listings 2.0-2.4x) minus ~15%/yr list decay minus ~8%/yr writing/ESP/growth cost = 17%. Thin data. Sources: nl_mult, ef_api, beehiiv, est. Losing: No base rate. Lists decay without growth spend; beehiiv's median free-to-paid conversion is 0.62%, so subscription-funded newsletters need very large lists. 1 of 2 live EF newsletter listings shows falling profit. Ukraine: yellow - sponsorship income by wire or Payoneer works, but paid subscriptions on beehiiv/Substack run on Stripe (closed to Ukraine) and the beehiiv ad-network payout route to Ukraine was not verified.
WordPress plugin / Chrome extension (distance 1): Good AI-maintenance fit and Freemius pays Ukraine, but almost no transaction data and few listings of useful size. Return basis: Typical: paid multiple ~3.0x (estimate; broker blogs price Chrome extensions at 24-36x MRR, i.e. 2-3x annual revenue; no WordPress plugin transaction data found) -> 33% yield minus ~12%/yr decline minus ~5%/yr frictions = 16%. Low confidence. Sources: ext_mult, freemius, cws, est. Losing: No data. Few listings in the $50-250k band; exposed to Chrome Web Store / WordPress.org policy changes (estimate). Ukraine: yellow - WordPress plugins sold via Freemius are green (Freemius supports 'Ukraine (non-sanctioned regions)', pays by wire/Payoneer). Chrome Web Store has no payments; most paid extensions use Stripe-based checkouts and must move to Paddle.
Amazon KDP book catalogue (distance 1): Numbers look good (about 22%/yr typical) and payouts reach Ukraine, but it is a single-platform asset outside the owner's skills. Return basis: Typical: paid multiple 2.4x -> 42% yield (EF live KDP/Merch median 2.5x, KDP-only 2.3x) minus ~15%/yr decline minus ~5%/yr frictions = 22%. Sources: ef_api, est. Losing: 4 of 13 live KDP/Merch listings on Empire Flippers show falling profit (median trend +42%, Oct 2026). Single-platform account risk; low-content books are easy to copy. Ukraine: yellow - KDP pays Ukraine by wire (sibling note); title transfers to a buyer's account happen on EF in practice, but Amazon's transfer rules and Ukrainian account eligibility were not re-verified here.
Content / affiliate site (distance 1): Cheapest yield on paper (about 42%) but Google and AI answers are draining traffic; after decline about 12%/yr with a fat loss tail - only worth it as a cheap audience for the owner's own product. Return basis: Typical: paid multiple 2.4x -> 42% cash yield (Flippa content sold average 2.32x H1 2026; FE 1.8-3.5x SDE; EF live content median 2.30x; Flippa live content asking median 2.67x) minus ~25%/yr profit decline (AI Overviews cut position-1 CTR 58%; 58% of EF content listings show falling profit; Flippa content deal value -39% half-on-half) minus ~5%/yr frictions = 12%. Sources: fl_h1, fe_buy, ef_api, fl_live, ahrefs, pew, core26, est. Losing: High. 7 of 12 content/affiliate listings on Empire Flippers show falling profit (Oct 2026). Users click a result in 8% of Google visits with an AI summary vs 15% without (Pew). Affiliate sites were reported as the hardest-hit category in the March 2026 core update (71% of tracked affiliate sites negative, aggregator), and only ~22% of HCU-hit sites recovered 20%+ of lost traffic (aggregator). Ukraine: yellow - AdSense pays Ukraine by USD wire (green). Mediavine pays via Tipalti (Ukraine not confirmed). Amazon Associates offers non-US affiliates only gift cards or paper checks. impact.com warns some accounts cannot be paid because of the war and sanctions. Check every revenue line before buying.
Music royalties (distance 1): The most passive model here, but a ~7% real yield means ~$1.7M for $10k/month, and the wire out of Ukraine is unconfirmed: only a place to park $1M+. Return basis: Royalty Exchange self-reported 12-month cash yields: 10.63% average, 13.35% life-of-rights, 8.70% 10-year (358 deals, H2 2020; re-returns). Price ~6.7x trailing income (re-multiple). Cash yield is not IRR: a 10-year term at 8.7% returns ~87% of principal if flat (IRR ~-2.5%); life-of-rights at 13% with 5-8%/yr decay gives IRR ~6-9%. 7% typical [Estimate]. Losing: Term deals lose principal unless income grows. Catalogue income usually decays; sound recordings are more volatile. No platform-wide loss rate is published after 2020. Ukraine: yellow-red: non-US investors allowed, no accreditation. Funds go by ACH or wire within 2 business days; US withholding up to 30% unless reduced by treaty (US-Ukraine rate unverified). Unclear whether the NBU e-limit (EUR 200k/yr, securities and corporate rights) covers a royalty contract. Income is personal foreign income (18% + 5%), not FOP. Spotter-type and SaaS revenue-share notes are institutional or US-only.
GPU rental (hardware) (distance 1): Hardware bought at inflated 2026 prices, volatile rental rates and Ukrainian rails make this a poor fit. Return basis: 4x RTX 5090 box ~$33k (EU street EUR 6,499-6,694, gpu-5090-eu) earns $700-1,400/mo (vast-earn) against colocation of ~$535-640/mo (2.55 kW x $210-250/kW, aliteq), so net $60-760/mo = 2-28%/yr before depreciation. A used 8x H100 at ~$168k (cloudzero), 65% utilisation at $2.5/h, earns ~$9.4k/mo; less ~$2k colocation = ~53% gross. After depreciation (H100 rental fell 64-75% from 2024 to Q2 2026) = ~10% typical [Estimate]. Losing: High for consumer GPUs bought at today's 3x-MSRP prices; H100 rental rates fell 64-75% in two years, then rose 25% in one month (Oct 2026). Returns swing with the market. Ukraine: red: physical hardware, which fails the digital gate. Home hosting means blackouts and a ruined reliability score. Colocation abroad means import and payment paperwork and the owner cannot travel to install. Vast pays international hosts only via PayPal or Wise (Wise is send-only on a Ukrainian address).
Domain flipping (distance 1): Lumpy, slow and near-zero typical return; expired-domain SEO is explicitly named in Google's spam policies. Return basis: 1,000 names at $40 = $40k. Renewals $12k/yr (.com wholesale $10.26). Sell-through 1.5%/yr = 15 sales at ~$1,000 (the 2025 NameBio average is ~$1,280 = $244M / 190,300 sales), less a 15-25% commission = ~$12k, so ~0% net. 'Professional' 30-50% claims are survivorship bias. 3% typical [Estimate]. Losing: Most beginner portfolios lose money to renewals; aggregators say beginner portfolios return 0-15%, and 1-2% sell-through is the norm. Ukraine: yellow-red: Sedo and Afternic pay by wire or PayPal, but many buyers pay through Escrow.com, which refuses Ukrainian banks. FOP treatment of domain resale is unclear. Expired-domain SEO is named spam by Google.
Buy Instagram / TikTok accounts (distance 1): Instagram's terms ban buying accounts outright; you can never own what you paid for. Return basis: Risk-adjusted return is about zero: income from a page can be high, but a ban, a seller takeback through account recovery, or reach throttling can wipe out the capital, and the buyer has no title. No base rate is published [Estimate]. Losing: No published base rate; account takebacks and bans are the common failure in marketplace forums. Ukraine: red: platform terms prohibit it (Instagram explicitly), the buyer has no title, and grey-market payments do not fit the FOP.
Shopify / Amazon FBA brand (distance 1): Fails the digital gate; shown only as the market's comparison point. Return basis: Typical: 2.5x -> 40% yield (EF live physical median 2.5x; Flippa ecommerce sold 1.55x; FE small DTC 2.5-4.5x SDE) minus ~10%/yr decline minus ~8%/yr inventory/3PL/tariff frictions = 22%. Margins only ~21% (EF live). Sources: ef_api, fl_h1, fe_buy, ef_soi, est. Losing: 47% of live physical listings on EF show falling profit; EF's own report recounts the Amazon FBA aggregator failures and tariff shocks. Ukraine: red - physical goods; Shopify Payments and Stripe are closed to Ukraine; fails the DIGITAL gate.
Ads into your own app (distance 3): Best fit in this track (owned, recurring, AI creative edge), but most apps lose their test budget, so run it as a capped portfolio of small tests with hard kill rules. Return basis: Median app cannot pay back paid installs: RevenueCat D60 revenue per install $0.34 all apps, $0.66 Health & Fitness, $3.09 hard paywall [rc] vs US iOS CPI $3.50-6.50 [cpi1,cpi2] => median H&F ~16% ROAS at D60, median hard paywall ~77% [est]. PvX casual-game cohorts: net ROAS at M12 P20 57%, P40 96%, P60 139%, P80 207% => ~40% never pay back in 12 months [pvx]. Only 4.6% of new apps reach $10k MRR in 2 years [rc]. Typical = most test budget lost; high = TrackAI-like winner: ~$120k/yr profit on ~$50k deployed [trackai, est]. Losing: High. 4.6% of newly launched subscription apps reach $10k MRR within 2 years and 17.3% reach $1k [rc]; among studios seeking UA financing ~40% of casual-game cohorts are below 1.0 net ROAS after 12 months [pvx]; TrustMRR mobile apps with revenue: median $175/30 days, 5.5% >= $10k [devto]. Estimate 75-90% chance a given app's paid-UA test loses money [est]. Ukraine: yellow: rails work - Apple/Google pay a FOP; Paddle supports iOS link-out web checkout since 12 May 2025 with RevenueCat integration and pays by wire/Payoneer [paddle_mob, rc_paddle]; Stripe unavailable. Blockers: 20% Ukrainian VAT on Meta ad spend is unrecoverable for a non-VAT FOP (DPS IPK 15.09.2026); group-3 tax is 6% of GROSS and the 10.09M UAH (~$240k) cap is exceeded at well under $10k/month net in high-turnover models; FX corporate card payments abroad unlimited, UAH corporate card 400k UAH/month (since 11 Aug 2026); new/inactive FOPs limited to 1M UAH/month transfers from 14 Nov 2026. ~$420k/yr revenue at the $10k/month level exceeds the group-3 cap.
Licensed iGaming ads (affiliate) (distance 2): The only paid-traffic model where the owner has a real edge (operator relationships), but platform restrictions are heavy and margins are thin even for the leader. Return basis: Scaled leader benchmark: Better Collective Paid Media Q3 2025 revenue EUR27.6m (CPA 14.9m, revshare 12.7m), costs 20.5m, EBITDA 7.1m = 26%; YTD 25%, FY2024 27% [bc_q3]; FY2025 EUR105.5m, 27% [bc_ar]. Payouts: UK casino CPA $200-400/FTD, revshare 25-35% NGR; Tier-1 casino median $250 [track360]. Newcomer typical negative: no Meta gambling authorization, no media deals, CPA float and revshare lag [est]. Losing: No base rate found. Even the listed market leader keeps only 25-27 cents per euro of revenue [bc_q3]; estimate >70% of newcomers lose money on paid gambling traffic [est]. Ukraine: yellow: operators pay by wire to a FOP FX account; Payoneer bars gambling in Checkout and lists prohibited transactions with case-by-case pre-approval [payo_chk, payo_tc]; Meta requires gambling authorization incl. affiliate landing pages [meta_gamb]; Google requires per-country certification [google_gamb]; Ukrainian banks may treat gambling-linked receipts as high risk [est]. 20% Ukrainian VAT on Meta ad spend is unrecoverable for a non-VAT FOP (DPS IPK 15.09.2026); group-3 tax is 6% of GROSS and the 10.09M UAH (~$240k) cap is exceeded at well under $10k/month net in high-turnover models; FX corporate card payments abroad unlimited, UAH corporate card 400k UAH/month (since 11 Aug 2026); new/inactive FOPs limited to 1M UAH/month transfers from 14 Nov 2026.
White-hat CPA traffic arbitrage (distance 2): Fast feedback but thin margins that Ukrainian VAT plus gross-turnover tax wipe out, nothing owned, and most newcomers lose; at most a capped learning budget. Return basis: Winners' ROI: sweepstakes 20-80%, e-com 15-70% (unsourced CIS guide) [ppcrebels]; paid-media margins 20-30% [pap]; scaled leader Better Collective Paid Media 25-27% EBITDA margin (~35% on spend) [bc_q3]. For a non-VAT group-3 FOP: spend S at 25% ROI -> revenue 1.25S, VAT 0.20S, tax 0.075S => profit -0.025S (a loss); VAT-registered (if credit offsets) ~0.21S [dtkt_vat, est]. Newcomer typical = losing [est]. Losing: No audited base rate found. 'Over 57% of affiliates earn below $10,000 per year' (revenue, all channels) [irev]; CIS teams give buyers 'unlimited ad budget' so team balance sheets absorb test losses; solo costs $300-800/month for accounts, proxies, tools [gdetraffic]. Estimate 70-90% of solo newcomers lose their test budget within 6 months [est]. Ukraine: yellow: KVED 73.11/73.12/63.99 on group 3 [yankiv]; payouts via wire/Payoneer to FOP OK; USDT payouts do not fit group 3; TikTok ads only via resellers [forbes_billing]. 20% Ukrainian VAT on Meta ad spend is unrecoverable for a non-VAT FOP (DPS IPK 15.09.2026); group-3 tax is 6% of GROSS and the 10.09M UAH (~$240k) cap is exceeded at well under $10k/month net in high-turnover models; FX corporate card payments abroad unlimited, UAH corporate card 400k UAH/month (since 11 Aug 2026); new/inactive FOPs limited to 1M UAH/month transfers from 14 Nov 2026.
Resell Telegram ad slots (distance 2): Needs little capital because it is really an ad agency: the limit is selling to advertisers, not money. Return basis: Exchanges already take 12.5-20% (Telega.in, Russian-owned, off-limits) [telega]; Ukrainian exchange Adsell Start package 22,000 UAH for 90k views (~244 UAH, ~$5.8 CPM) [adsell]; UA channel CPM 50-400 UAH by topic [telegator]. Reseller markup estimated 10-25%; unsold pre-bought slots and bot-inflated channels eat it; demand-limited [est]. Losing: No data. Main losses: unsold prepaid inventory and fake-view channels [est]. Ukraine: yellow: Ukrainian UAH market works with card payments [adsell]; Telegram Ads self-serve pays in Gram/TON (crypto, poor fit with group 3) [tg_ads] or via resellers such as Netpeak (min EUR500, gambling banned) [mediamaker]; Russian exchanges are off-limits.
Paid leads for Bali/Phuket developers (distance 2): A real relationship edge in buying-and-reselling customers, but lumpy, slow and not truly recurring. Return basis: Phuket villas pay 5-7% at presale, condos 3-5%, paid 50% at reservation deposit and 50% at completion [aster]; Bali about 3%, 5-7% on some primary sales [balinsky]. US real-estate Meta CPL $35-65 (no Bali/Phuket CPL found) [cleverzebo]. At $50 CPL and 1% lead-to-sale: ~$5k ads per sale vs $12.5k commission on a $250k villa at 5% => ~$7.5k net per sale before splits [est]. Losing: No data on lead-to-sale conversion for Bali/Phuket; estimate 50-70% chance the first $10k ad test returns less than it cost [est]. Ukraine: yellow: commissions by wire from Indonesia/Thailand to a FOP FX account work; use referral agreements or local partner companies (foreign brokering restricted); 20% VAT on Meta spend and 6% gross tax still apply.
Grey traffic arbitrage (excluded) (distance 2): Excluded: the famous arbitrage ROIs live here, and the owner will not do grey or illegal work. Return basis: Claimed winner ROIs gambling 50-200%, crypto 60-300%, nutra 30-120%, dating 30-100% (unsourced) [ppcrebels]; not evaluated further - owner excludes grey/illegal work. Losing: Not evaluated; the industry's headline ROIs come mostly from these verticals. Ukraine: red: ToS violations, cloaking and deception; criminal liability attaches to these methods per a Ukrainian law firm [yankiv]; payouts typically in USDT (incompatible with group 3).
Retail trading (CFD, forex, day trading) (distance 0): A losing game for 70-97% of players; not a business. Return basis: Mandatory disclosures: 51-82% of retail CFD accounts lose money at 14 UK brokers, median 71% (cfd_uk); ESMA 74-89% (esma). Brazil: 97% of people who day-traded 300+ days lost money, 1.1% earned above minimum wage (brazil). Taiwan: ~13% profitable in a typical year, <1% (1,000 of 360,000) consistently (taiwan). Typical -20% is an estimate. Losing: 70% (median broker disclosure) to 97% (persistent Brazilian day traders) lose money. Ukraine: red - funding a foreign broker breaches NBU rules (MCC 6211 excluded); gains taxed 23%.
Prop-firm challenges (distance 0): The firm's business model is your failed challenge fees; 7% ever get paid. Return basis: FPFX Tech data, 300k+ accounts across 10 firms: 14% pass, ~45% of those ever get paid = ~7% of buyers; average payout ~4% of plan size; The Funded Trader says only 1-2% of clients get paid; 80-100 prop firms disappeared in 2024 (prop). Return expressed on fees spent; typical is an estimate. Losing: ~93% of challenge buyers never receive a payout (prop). Ukraine: yellow - fees payable by card as a service; payouts via crypto/payment apps; income taxed.
Prediction markets (distance 0): 84% lose; the winners are a few dozen professional bots and insiders. Return basis: Sergeenkov on 2.5M wallets (to 2026-04-01): 84.1% lost money, 2% made >$1k, 0.033% (840) made >$100k (poly84); under 1% of wallets take half the profits (poly_cd). Typical is an estimate. Losing: 84% of wallets lose money (poly84). Ukraine: yellow - Polymarket blocks Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk but not the rest of Ukraine (poly_geo); needs crypto (NBU hryvnia ban); status under UA gambling law unclear.
Sports-betting arbitrage (distance 0): Small real edge that bookmakers shut down within months; a job, not a money machine. Return basis: 0.5-3% per arb; arbers typically stake-limited ('gubbed') within 3-6 months; UKGC review of ~15M accounts found 4.31% restricted (surebet). Annual return on a small bankroll is an estimate and collapses once accounts are limited. Losing: Per-arb losses from voided bets/palps are common; the near-certain outcome is account limitation within months (surebet). Ukraine: red - only licensed Ukrainian operators are legal and few; arbing would also burn the owner's licensed-operator iGaming relationships.
CS2 skin flipping (distance 1): A market one company can reprice overnight, as it did on 23 Oct 2025. Return basis: On 2025-10-23 a Valve update let five Covert skins trade up into a knife/glove; knife and glove prices fell 20-50% (cs2_mwn), one tracked segment fell $609M -> $337M (-45%) (cs2_cap); total-market estimates of the loss range ~$1.8-3B. Typical is an estimate. Losing: Holders of knives/gloves lost 20-50% in a day in Oct 2025 (cs2_mwn). Ukraine: yellow - Steam works; cash-out via third-party sites and crypto is grey; income taxable.
Crypto trading (distance 0): A price bet, not income; most retail buyers historically lost. Return basis: BIS Bulletin 69: across Aug 2015-Dec 2022 'a majority of crypto app users in nearly all economies made losses on their bitcoin holdings', as retail bought while large holders sold (bis69). Oct 10, 2025: ~$19B liquidated in a day (oct10). Typical is an estimate. Losing: Majority of retail app users lost money on bitcoin (bis69). Ukraine: yellow - hryvnia purchases banned since 2022 (forinsurer), P2P route monitored (aktualno); gains taxed 18%+5% (incrypted).
Money → earning asset → money, with AI as the operator
Buy a small subscription app that already earns, paid by Apple or Google. AI runs it and stops the decline. Its cash buys the next one.
App Store or Google Play subscriptions, Paddle-billed software, YouTube (AdSense). All of them pay a Ukrainian FOP, and the asset transfers with its users.
Stripe-billed software: subscribers must move to Paddle (median 12 days). Newsletters: sell sponsors by invoice, as beehiiv’s ad network needs Stripe.
Amazon Associates sites (gift card or cheque only), content sites hit by Google AI summaries, Telegram bots paid in TON, share deals (buying a foreign company), anything that must settle through Escrow.com.
Like the Android utility app on Flippa: $56k asking, $2,330 a month. Only 1 year old, so check the trend.
Like the Android TV subscription app (5 years old, $117,782) or the iOS AI app ($180,612). Unverified revenue: due diligence first.
Like the iOS sleep app on Empire Flippers ($301,428). Young apps shrink fastest: needs AI growth from week one.
| # | What is for sale | Asking | Profit / mo | Multiple | Money comes in via | You could own it? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Flippa · Android utility app1 year · revenue verified | $56,000 | $2,330 | 2× | Google Play / in-app ads | yes |
| 02 | Flippa · YouTube how-to channel3 years · revenue not verified | $60,000 | $1,980 | 2.5× | AdSense (YouTube) + other | yes |
| 03 | Empire Flippers · YouTube channel (women's sports)since Aug 2024 · revenue verified | $80,890 | $3,517 | 1.92× | AdSense (YouTube) + sponsorships | yes |
| 04 | Flippa · Android TV browser app (subscriptions)5 years · revenue not verified | $117,782 | $5,420 | 1.8× | Google Play subscriptions (EUR 4.9k MRR) | yes |
| 05 | Flippa · iOS AI app (subscriptions)2 years · revenue not verified | $180,612 | $6,390 | 2.4× | App Store subscriptions | yes |
| 06 | Empire Flippers · YouTube channel (documentary lore)since Sep 2024 · revenue verified | $209,725 | $10,923 | 1.6× | AdSense (YouTube) + sponsorships | yes |
| 07 | TrustMRR · Mobile appsince Mar 2026 · revenue verified | $300,000 | $23,385 | 1.07× | RevenueCat (app store billing) | yes |
| 08 | Empire Flippers · iOS wellness/sleep app (subscriptions)since Jun 2025 · revenue verified | $301,428 | $12,559 | 2× | App Store via RevenueCat | yes |
| 09 | TrustMRR · AI SaaS (social comments/DM assistant)since Jan 2025 · revenue verified | $475,000 | $10,663 | 3.7× | Paddle (merchant of record), API-verified revenue | yes |
| 10 | TrustMRR · Developer-tool micro-SaaS (form backend)since 2020 · revenue verified | $40,000 | $918 | 3.6× | Stripe (API-verified) | with work |
| 11 | Flippa · AI product-design SaaSn/a · revenue verified | $49,900 | $1,400 | 3× | Not stated (likely Stripe) | with work |
| 12 | Flippa · AI captioning SaaS3 years · revenue verified | $110,000 | $3,000 | 3.1× | Not stated (likely Stripe) | with work |
Examples to show what money buys, not recommendations. Asking prices; Empire Flippers deals close ~17% below asking on average. Every one needs due diligence (revenue proof, trend, reviews, churn).
Why this beats the other routes for you: - Fast: cash flow starts with the first platform payout after the transfer, around week 8–12. Nothing to build or sell first. - Digital, monthly, owned: subscriptions renew every month, and the app is yours: your developer account, your brand. - AI-run: sellers report 5–10 hours a week. AI does the store work, tests and updates, and you approve. - Legal and paid in Ukraine: Apple and Google pay a FOP in USD. Paddle accepts Ukrainian sellers.
What can go wrong: - the app keeps shrinking (41% of listings already are); - a store policy change; - the seller misstated revenue (Flippa scams with fake screenshots exist); - the bank refuses the payment abroad.
Rules that limit the damage: buy only verified revenue with 2+ years of history, never pay more than ~2.8×, keep each asset under a third of the capital, and ask for seller financing or an earn-out.
Tax ceiling: the FOP group 3 cap is 10.09M UAH a year (~$222k at today’s rate). At ~45% app margins that is ~$8.3k a month of profit. Above it you need another structure; ask an accountant before buying asset #3.
From "we have the money" to the first payout. AI does the screening, diligence, drafts and growth work; you do accounts, signatures and calls.
Your FOP bank agrees to pay a foreign seller for an app under an asset-purchase contract. If not: Ukrainian assets only (Telegram channels) and war bonds.
Verified revenue, 2+ years old, profit flat or rising, seller financing asked. Otherwise keep screening; don’t force a deal.
Apple or Google pays into the FOP USD account. Book it as FOP income; check it matches the seller’s numbers.
Profit flat or growing → buy #2 with cash flow and capital. Still shrinking → fix for one more month or relist on Empire Flippers.
The plan assumes the capital is in Ukraine, in UAH or cash dollars. Money already abroad (or in crypto) changes the routes: say so and we’ll redo the legal check.
Timing is grounded in the research: 30–60 days from offer to close, plus 2–8 weeks for the handover (FE International, Empire Flippers). Apple and Google pay monthly after each month closes. Paying a foreign seller in advance requires the asset to be delivered within 180 days (State Tax Service).
What a Ukrainian resident can and cannot do with capital in October 2026
No foreign broker, T-bills, P2P or loans abroad
The €200k-a-year investment allowance (e-limit) is not granted under martial law (NBU Resolution 18). Funding Interactive Brokers from a Ukrainian bank is not a legal route.
Unex Bank · NBU Board Resolution No. 90 of 10.08.2026 amending Resolutio
As a FOP import, under contract
Buy the app as an asset (not the seller’s company), pay from the FOP account, asset delivered within 180 days. As a private person you can only send UAH 200k a month (~$4.4k).
Most website deals settle through it
Acquire.com’s default escrow and small Flippa deals are out. Routes left: Empire Flippers’ own escrow or FlippaPay (wire or Payoneer). Not yet confirmed with them.
Google Play, AdSense/YouTube, Paddle, Freemius, Apple
Google lists Ukraine for wire payouts; Paddle and Freemius accept Ukrainian sellers. Apple pays Ukrainian developers in USD (developer reports; no official Apple country page found). Stripe does not pay you, Amazon Associates pays foreigners only by gift card or cheque, and Telegram pays in TON (outside the FOP).
Google Play Console Help · AdSense payment methods by country · Paddle · Freemius supported countries · Apple App Store Connect
Thin margins hit it first
Group 3 caps revenue at 10.09M UAH. At today’s rate that allows ~$4.6k a month net from ad arbitrage (25% margin), ~$8.3k from apps (45%) and ~$12.7k from software (69%). Ukrainian consultants say single tax is due on gross store sales, before Apple’s or Google’s cut.
Unrecoverable for a non-VAT FOP
A campaign returning 25% on spend ends at about −2.5% after the VAT and the 6% single tax (tax-service ruling, 15 Sep 2026). Paid ads only pay with big margins.
0% vs 23% elsewhere
OVDP interest is exempt from income tax and the military levy. Deposits, corporate bonds and trading gains pay 18% + 5%. A FOP cannot book passive income under the 5% single tax.
Buying with hryvnia banned since 2022
P2P card purchases are monitored. Gains are taxed 18% + 5% personally under the tax service’s interim position; the crypto tax bill is not yet law.
Not legal or tax advice. The VAT, withholding and bank-acceptance questions for buying an app from a foreign seller are not answered in public sources: ask your bank and an accountant before the first offer.
Exchange rate used: NBU official 45.5382 UAH/$ (27 Oct 2026), up from 41.9969 a year earlier, a fall of the hryvnia of 8.4%.
The 11 Aug 2026 easing (NBU Resolution 90): - individuals may buy up to UAH 200k a month of foreign currency per bank; - foreign-issuer securities count within that limit, but only through the Ukrainian depository; - card payments abroad are capped at UAH 200k a month, and brokers are excluded.
Cash dollars can be bought without limit and kept in Ukrainian banks or in USD war bonds.
From 14 Nov 2026 new or inactive group 3 FOPs face a UAH 1M monthly transfer limit (7eminar). Ask the bank how that applies to a large one-off payment.
The purest money → money ideas are the ones most people lose at. Measured, not guessed:
of retail CFD accounts lose money (median of 14 UK broker disclosures). 97% of Brazilians who day-traded 300+ days lost money.
The Investors Centre · Chague, De-Losso, Giovannetti, 'Day Trading for a Living?'
of buyers never receive a payout (FPFX data, 300k+ accounts). 80–100 prop firms disappeared in 2024.
of 2.5M Polymarket wallets lost money; under 1% of wallets take half the profits.
liquidated in one day (10 Oct 2025). The BIS found most crypto-app users lost money on bitcoin.
CoinGecko · BIS Bulletin 69, 'Crypto shocks and retail losses'
knife and glove prices in one day after Valve’s 23 Oct 2025 update.
is the margin of the listed leader’s paid-media arm. The famous 50–300% ROIs come from grey verticals (nutra, unlicensed gambling, cloaking).
Better Collective Q3 2025 interim report · PPC Rebels / AffCommunity CPA guide 2025-2026
until bookmakers limit your stakes; 0.5–3% per arb before that. It would also burn your iGaming network.
clicks for the #1 result when Google shows an AI summary. 58% of content listings on Empire Flippers show falling profit.
Ahrefs · Empire Flippers public listings API, all 169 'For Sale' list
Research files: research_notes/Money to money/ a_buy_business, b_buy_customers, c_yield_lend_speculate, d_buy_distribution_flip (markdown + JSON). Every number there is tagged [Primary], [Press], [Survey], [Aggregator] or [Estimate].
Four research agents used 121 web searches in total (26 + 29 + 30 + 36) and no search workarounds. Primary data was pulled directly: Empire Flippers public API (169 listings), Flippa public pages (256 cards), TrustMRR (47 listings), NBU exchange-rate API, US Treasury yield curve, DeFiLlama, Binance funding history.
We re-checked by hand on 27 Oct 2026: Escrow.com lists Ukraine as unsupported; the NBU rate is 45.5382 UAH/$; Unex Bank’s e-limit page states the martial-law restrictions under NBU Resolution 18.
"Chance of losing" figures are measured where a base rate exists (CFD, Polymarket, prop firms, RevenueCat app outcomes) and are our estimates elsewhere. No audited loss rate exists for small app or website purchases.
Not legal, tax or investment advice.